proving its most general version will be a good heuristic device for finding a short proof. Consider, as a simple example, how a standard resolution theorem prover proves the inference (p 1 ∧…∧p n ) → (q 1 ∧…∧q m ), (p 1 ∧…∧p n ) fl L (q 1 ∧…∧q m ). It will assume the premises and the negation of the conclusion, convert them into clausal form, and then will derive ƒ by iterated application of the resolution rule. The standard procedure of conversion into clausal form will produce the following set of m+n+1 clauses: {¬p 1 ∨…∨¬p n ∨q i | 1≤i≤m} » {p i | 1≤i≤n} » {¬q 1 ∨…∨¬q m }. In order to prove ƒ from this set of clauses, the resolution proof tree will produce m.n+m = m.(n+1) branching points: it has to resolve each clause ¬p 1 ∨…∨¬p n ∨q i (1≤i≤m) with each of the atomic clauses p i (1≤i≤n) in order to obtain q i , and then each q i with ¬q 1 ∨…∨¬q m . It would be much more economically, of course, to prove this inference by proving its most general version, which is p→q, p fl L q (via the substitution function σ(p) = (p 1 ∧…∧p n ) and σ(q) = (q 1 ∧…∧q m )). It translates into clausal form as ¬p∨q, p, ¬q fl L ƒ and its proved with only two branching points.
Standard resolution does not take care of generality. How could a theorem prover which always proofs the most general version of a theorem look like? The easiest possibility is a forward chaining natural deduction theorem prover. Its theorems are sequents, i.e. inferences of the form ∆ fl L B with ∆ possibly empty.
They are proved from a given set of sequent axioms (of the form Γ fl L A) and a given set of sequent rules (of the form ∆ 1 fl L B 1 , (∆ 2 fl L B 2 , …) / ∆ fl L B). A sequent theorem prover which always proves the most general version of an inference can be immediately obtained from a (sound and complete) recursive axiomatization of the most general inferences of L, with help of most general sequent axioms and generality-preserving sequent rules (cf. §1.5 below). If applied to a factual knowledge base K, such a theorem prover would prove consequences of K by searching for a proof of most general sequents Γ fl L B with σ(Γ) = K for some substitution function σ; each time it succeeds it will return the consequence C:=σ(B), the relevant substitution function σ and the underlying most general sequent Γ fl L B. -If such a theorem prover is implementent in a backward-chaining way, it will try to prove a goal C by searching for a proof of a most general sequent Γ fl L B with σ(B) = C for 5 some σ and then searching for a proof of σ(Γ). The difficulty here is that in the usual case several different sequents Γ i fl L B i with σ(B i ) = C for some σ will be available, and an additional heuristics is needed which specifies the chances of finding a proof of σ(Γ i ).
Indepedent of the question how a theorem prover which proves always the most general version of a theorem can be implemented, the existence of a recursive axiomatization of the most general theorems or inferences of a given logic will be a necessary presupposition as well as a natural starting point of its implementation.
Herein I see the interest of my question for theorem proving. By the way, besides the advantage of finding short proofs, a theorem prover of the described sort will enjoy a second advantage in systems where the derived theorems or inferences have to be stored for further application. This is, e.g., the case in models of belief revision based on dependency recording backtracking, as in [8] . It will be most economic to store only the most general versions of theorems, because all the other ones can be obtained from them by substitution.
Relevance.
A second application comes from the field of relevant deductive inference. Relevance is an important desideratum of inference machines in rule-based expert systems (cf. [7] and [10, §5.4]) or in inductive machine learning ([cf. [9] ). According to the approach developed by Schurz and Weingartner ([11] , [14] ), a formula A is a relevant deductive consequence of a set of premises Γ (in a given logic L) if Γ fl L A and no predicate in A can be replaced on some of its occurrences by every other predicate (of the same arity), salva validitate of the inference. To check whether a given inference has a relevant conclusion requires to decide whether certain inferences are valid or not, which may be a rather complex procedure. For most general inferences, however, it is easy to prove (cf. [12] , p. 71) that they have a relevant conclusion iff all predicates of the conclusion occur also in the premise set, and the latter condition can be tested straightforwardly. Moreover, it follows from this connection that if the most general inferences were recursively enumerable (r.e.), then the most general inferences with relevant conclusions were r.e., too. This is of interest because it was proved by Schurz ([11] , p. 41) and independently by Osher-6 son and Weinstein ( [9] , p. 440) that the set of all classical first order inferences with relevant conclusions is not r.e. On independent reasons, Weingartner ([15] , p. 328) has suggested a stronger notion of relevance, call it strict relevance, which adds the requirement of maximal generality to that of relevant conclusion, and, moreover, applies not only to inferences but to logical theorems of any sort, since it replaces the concept of "relevant conclusion" by that of "relevant positive subformula".
1.4
From closed λ-terms to purely implicational propositional logic. Generality w.r.t. substitution plays an important role in the study of the interrelations between type assignement systems of combinatoric logic or λ-calculus and propositional logic (cf. [6] , [7] , [4] ). Based on various earlier works it is demonstrated in Hindley and Meredith [7] how each type of a closed term corresponds to a purely implicational formula of propositional logic (the so-called Curry-Howard isomorphism) and how different type assignement systems (TA systems) correspond to different systems of propositional logic (classical, intuitionistic, relevance, BCK, BCI). A term has always many types which are closed under substitution, and it is of greatest interest to find the most general type of a term (which is also called its principal type). 7 logic, which has as its algebraic counterpart the BCK-algebras with operation S.
With Θ, Θ 1 , Θ 2 … (as well as Θ, A) for formula sequences, ˜(Θ) for the set of propositional variables in sequent Θ, and F(Θ) for the set of formulas contained in Θ,
Wrónski's axiomatization is as follows:
The unique axiom:
p fl p, for p ∈ ˜.
Rules: There is one ticklish point in answering this question. In the search for an axiomatization of the most general theorems we assume, of course, that no essential information gets lost in such an axiomatization. In other words, we presuppose that 8 substitutions have the following property "ExMax" (existence of maxima):
It is easy to prove this property for propositional logic, because the number of generalizations of a given propositional formula A modulo ≡ σ is finite (for, each generalization replaces a subformula of A by a propositional variable), whence there must exist a maximal generalization (unique modulo ≡ σ ) which still is an L-theorem. Surprisingly, it will turn out in § 2 that for the usual definition of σ-substitutions in predicate logic, (ExMax) is not generally satisfied. However, a slightly restricted definition of substitutions is possible, so-called argument-conserving substitutions, for which (ExMax) holds, and we will answer our question for this kind of substitutions.
To fix terminology, σ will vary in the following always over arbitrary substitutions for predicate letters, while ε varies only over argument-conserving σ−substitutions (σ and ε are defined in § 2). Finally, π varies over simple predicate-substitutions; these are uniform replacements of predicates by predicates of the same arity. In predicate logic, π is a subcase of ε which is a subcase of σ, while in propositional logic, all three coincide. π-and ε−substitutions satisfy the property (ExMax) while σ−substitutions do not. To make the reference to the given kind of substitution functions explicit, we will speak from now on always of "σ−generality", "ε-generality" and "π-generality".
Throughout the following, L ranges over all logics extending intuitionistic propositional or first order logic (cf., e.g., Bell/Machover [1] , pp. 434f) -the so-called intermediate logics. So, L is a subset of the propositional or first order language containing the intuitionistic (propositional or first order) logic and being closed under MP, ∀-generalization rule and σ-substitution rule. We will prove that given L is recursively enumerable (r.e.), then the sets of L's most ε-general and L's most π-general theorems are r.e. only if L is decidable. Note that also the other direction of the theorem is true, but on trivial reasons. The same result holds, of course, for the recursive 9 enumerability of L-inferences (because they are definable via
The result is also transferrable to modal logics, as indicated in the end of the paper.
The theorem implies a limitation to the search for recursive axiomatizations of the most general theorems of a logic. It tells us that the most general theorems of classical first order logic (but also those of various further logics which are undecidable) are not r.e. The very general upshot of this result is that if a logic is undecidable, then its semi-decidability (i.e., its recursive enumerability) is not really a big 'compensation' of this lack of decidability, because its most interesting theorems, namely its most general ones, will not even be semi-decidable. Our theorem implies this limi- known; cf., e.g., [1] , ch. 2, § 3). We will make use of the following abbreviations:
Let us give a brief explanation of the concept of σ-substitution. Our explication follows that of Kleene. (Cf. [6] , pp.155-162; the only difference is that Kleene defines σ only for those formulas where no renaming of bound variables is needed to exclude confusion of variables. A slightly different but equivalent explication can be found in Pogorzelski and Prucnal [10] .) Consider an n-ary predicate R. We assume it to be attached with pairwise distinct variables z 1 _ n , which figure as name form variables carrying the substitution for Rz 1 _ n . Take a formula B which shall be substituted for Rz 1 
It follows that whenever σ is reversible w.r.t. R in A, σ R A:=A* is equally σ−general as A, and there exists a substitution function σ * such that σA = σ*A*, where σ* is like σ except that it does not change the predicate of σR. Hence, A* contains one predicate less w.r.t. which σ* is reversible, compared with A and σ. If we replace in this manner all predicates in A w.r.t. which σ is reversible, we obtain a formula A** and substitution function σ** such that A is equally σ-general as A**, σ**A** = σA, and σ** is nonredundant w.r.t. A**. It follows that whenever an L- Thus neither (1) nor any σ-generalization of it will be among the set of most σ−general theorems of first order logic.
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It is reasonable, therefore, to restrict σ-substitutions to argument-conserving substitution functions ε: ε ranges over all those σ-substitution functions which assign to each n-ary predicate R a formula σR which contains all the name form variables The proof of (*) is obvious: Assume A* is the result of such a replacement, so fl L A↔ A*. Certainly A* is not longer than A. ‚ or ƒ will occur in A* in one of the following subformulas at the left, and these can be replaced by the following shorter 14 formulas at the right:
Because all these equivalences are theorems of our logic L (which extends, recall, intuitionistic propositional or first order logic), and the law of replacing logical equivalents holds in L, the result of this replacement will lead to a formula A** which is logically equivalent with A* and thus with A, but shorter than A* and thus shorter than A.
The basic idea of the proof of our theorem is to try to find an effectively construc- A and A* always the alphabetic variants of these formulas; of course they also satisfy the assumptions of the main lemma. We may also assume (by predicaterelettering in B) that (+) Each predicate in B which is changed by ε does not occur in A or A*.
We proceed stepwise, proving each step by deriving a contradiction. In what follows, At stands always for an atomic formula, and P(At) for its predicate.
First, we show that B has the form B 1 →(B 2 ↔B 3 ) with εB 1 = Id(A,A*), εB 2 = p∧A and εB 3 = p∧A*. If not, then either B must be an atomic formula, which can't be an L-theorem; or it must be of the form B 1 →At, with εAt = (p∧A ↔ p∧A*). Certainly P(At) ∉ ¸(B 1 ), because p ∉Id(A,A*); so again, B 1 →At can't be a theorem (which is proved, e.g., by substituting ƒ for P(At), which yields fl L B 1 →ƒ, contradicting the fact that Id(A,A*) and hence B 1 is L-consistent).
Second, we show that B 2 and B 3 can't be atomic formulas. Assume in the contrary that B 2 = At. Because εAt = A contains p ∉Id(A,A*), P(At) can't be in B 1 , and because εAt contains only unstarred predicates which are not in A*, P(At) can't be in B 3 . Again we show that in this case that B 1 → (At ↔ B 3 ) can't be an L-theorem.
Let σ be the function which assigns ƒ to P(At) (and does nothing else) and let π -1 be the inverse of π, which replaces each R* ∈ ¸(A*) by R. By applying first σ, then ε The following modified law is a theorem of (intuitionistic and classical) modal logics: With this modification, the proof goes through as before.
